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The Bank of Canada is leading a research program    y
to address whether and how the monetary policy 
framework in Canada might be improved.
Part of this research relates to the potential costs    y
and beneﬁ  ts of replacing the Bank’s inﬂ  ation-
targeting regime with a price-level targeting 
regime.
This article reviews arguments for and against    y
price-level targeting put forward by researchers at 
the Bank of Canada, at other central banks, and in 
academia.
It summarizes four main arguments in favour of    y
price-level targeting and discusses some issues 
related to its optimality and implementation.
I
n November 2006, the Bank of Canada and the 
Government of Canada announced the renewal of 
the Bank’s inﬂ  ation-control target for a period of ﬁ  ve 
years, to the end of 2011. The agreement stipulated 
that the Bank would continue to aim to keep CPI 
inﬂ  ation at two per cent, with a one to three per cent 
control range around the target. In a background 
document to the renewal (Bank of Canada 2006), 
the Bank announced its intention to lead a research 
program to address whether and how the monetary 
policy framework in Canada might be improved. The 
background document raised two broad sets of ques-
tions. The ﬁ  rst related to the possibility of lowering 
the inﬂ  ation target below two per cent. The second 
related to the potential costs and beneﬁ  ts of replacing 
the inﬂ  ation-targeting (henceforth IT) regime with a 
price-level targeting (henceforth PT) regime. An IT 
regime is deﬁ  ned as a regime in which the central 
bank aims to keep some measure of inﬂ  ation, such as 
CPI inﬂ  ation, close to a target rate. By contrast, under 
a PT regime, the central bank’s aim is to stabilize the 
price level around a known target path, leading it to 
target a lower (higher) inﬂ  ation rate after a positive 
(negative) shock to inﬂ  ation in order to bring the price 
level back to its target path.1
This article is concerned with the second set of ques-
tions. There is a substantial body of research that 
examines the costs and beneﬁ  ts of PT compared with 
IT. This article reviews four main arguments from the 
modern academic literature advanced in favour of PT.2 
In the next section, the traditional arguments for and 
against PT are summarized. This is followed by an 
1   A PT regime does not necessarily mean that the long-run price level is constant, since the 
target path may have a positive slope (which determines the long-run rate of inﬂ  ation). 
What a PT regime does mean is that the central bank acts to offset deviations of the price 
level from the target path.
2  An older literature on PT goes back to Keynes, Fisher, Wicksell, and others. See Duguay 
(1994) for a cogent survey.
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intertemporal information, since the relative price of 
future goods in terms of today’s goods is predictable, 
as argued by Coulombe (1998a, 1998b).
This begs the question of why individuals sign 
long-term contracts that stipulate the value of future 
payments in nominal terms. There is not a strong 
consensus among economists as to why this is the 
case, but the prevalence of contracts with ﬁ  xed nom-
inal payments is not in doubt. Fischer (1994) argued 
that the beneﬁ  ts of reduced uncertainty concerning 
the real value of payments could not be very high, 
given that individuals in the private sector could easily 
use other means, such as indexed bonds and con-
tingent contracts, to mitigate the uncertainty without 
any change in the monetary policy regime. Others 
infer on the basis of the same evidence that the use of 
these measures by individuals must be economically 
costly. For example, Howitt (2001) judged that “long-
term price-level uncertainty is one of the most serious 
consequences of inﬂ  ation, because of its ruinous 
effects on long-term contracting.”5
If reduced price-level uncertainty is the main argu-
ment traditionally invoked in favour of PT, the 
traditional argument against PT is that it must raise 
the short-run variability of both inﬂ  ation and output. 
The logic of this argument seems straightforward. 
In response to a temporary, unexpected increase 
(decrease) in inﬂ  ation in a PT regime, inﬂ  ation would 
have to be reduced below (above) its long-run target 
rate in the short run in order to move the price level 
back to its target growth path. This increases the 
variability of inﬂ  ation, taking the initially lower (higher) 
price level as a starting point. Since monetary policy 
operates by affecting aggregate demand, the way to 
move the price level back down towards the target 
path would be to raise interest rates in order to reduce 
aggregate demand. Since no such reduction would be 
necessary under an IT regime, the variability of output 
would also be lower under IT.
To summarize, the traditional view sees PT as a 
trade-off between the longer-run beneﬁ  ts of increased 
price-level predictability and the short-run costs 
of increased variability of both prices and output. 
Formal models from the early 1990s largely conﬁ  rmed 
4   The existence of imperfectly indexed long-term nominal contracts has implications for the 
effects of price-level shocks on the distribution of wealth under PT and IT. This is an active 
area of research. See, for example, Doepke and Schneider (2006), Meh, Ríos-Rull, and 
Terajima (2008), and Meh and Terajima (2008). 
5  Some recent work analyzes the welfare beneﬁ  ts from reduced uncertainty surrounding 
the real value of the payoffs of nominal contracts. These studies take the existence of 
long-term nominal contracts as given. See for example Doepke and Schneider (2006) or 
Meh and Terajima (2008).
assessment of three of the four main arguments for 
PT arising from recent research. First, committing to 
PT affects expectations of future inﬂ  ation and leads 
to a better trade-off in the short run between inﬂ  ation 
and output. Second, assigning a price-level target to a 
central bank that cannot commit to its future policies 
can, to some extent, substitute for that commitment 
and lead to improved economic performance. Third, 
it can lead to smaller forecast errors for ﬁ  rms that use 
these forecasts to set their prices. The following sec-
tion discusses the fourth argument: PT can be bene-
ﬁ  cial if it reduces the degree to which wage contracts 
are indexed, since it improves the economy’s ability 
to react to real shocks. Other issues related to PT are 
then discussed brieﬂ  y before the article concludes.
Committing to PT affects expectations 
of future inﬂ  ation and leads to a better 
trade-off between inﬂ  ation and output.
Price-Level Targeting: Arguments 
For and Against 
The Bank of Canada’s current target rate of inﬂ  ation 
is two per cent. If the annualized rate of inﬂ  ation 
is unexpectedly above that rate during the current 
period, then under the Bank’s IT regime, the target 
remains at two per cent going forward. Under a PT 
regime, the inﬂ  ation target would be reduced to below 
two per cent until the price level itself returned to its 
original targeted growth path.3 The positive inﬂ  ation 
surprise is offset. Under IT, there is no such offset. A 
temporary inﬂ  ation shock leads to a permanent shift 
in the time path of the price level (this is referred to 
as “price-level drift”), and shocks to inﬂ  ation have a 
cumulative impact on the price level. The future price 
level is increasingly hard to predict as the forecast 
horizon increases, and becomes virtually unpredict-
able at sufﬁ  ciently long horizons.
The long-run predictability of the price level under PT 
is precisely the source of the intuitive appeal of this 
monetary policy regime. It means that the real value 
of future payments speciﬁ  ed contractually in nominal 
terms is more predictable than it would be under an 
3  This obviously applies in reverse in response to a negative shock to inﬂ  ation.
20  
PRICE-LEVEL TARGETING AND STABILIZATION POLICY: A REVIEW 
BANK OF CANADA REVIEW   SPRING  2009between aggregate output with sticky prices, and 
what output would be with complete price ﬂ  exibility.8 
The New Keynesian model can be used to derive the 
optimal monetary policy for a central bank that sets 
short-term nominal interest rates in order to reduce 
the variability of both inﬂ  ation and the output gap.9 If 
the central bank can commit to a time path for future 
interest rates and if the public believes that it will stick 
to this announced path (so that its commitment is 
credible), its optimal policy has the feature that the 
price level itself is stable in the long run.10 In response 
to a cost-push shock to the inﬂ  ation rate, inﬂ  ation 
initially moves less than the value of the shock itself as 
the central bank moves the short-term interest rate to 
affect aggregate demand to partially offset the effect 
on inﬂ  ation. Starting with the ﬁ  rst period after the 
shock dissipates, inﬂ  ation changes sign, and the price 
level is gradually brought back to its initial pre-shock 
value. It appears as if the central bank is targeting the 
price level itself.
The logic of how a commitment to reducing future 
inﬂ  ation can be beneﬁ  cial is simple. By committing 
to a reduction in future inﬂ  ation (in response to a 
positive cost-push shock) even after the shock has 
passed, current expectations of future inﬂ  ation are 
reduced. According to the New Keynesian Phillips 
curve, current inﬂ  ation depends directly on expected 
future inﬂ  ation as well as on the output gap. This 
improves the trade-off between inﬂ  ation and output 
in the current period, reducing the output loss 
associated with ﬁ  ghting inﬂ  ation in the face of a posi-
tive cost-push shock. This in turn reduces inﬂ  ation 
persistence, thereby reducing inﬂ  ation variability. The 
New Keynesian Phillips curve assigns a crucial role to 
forward-looking expectations of inﬂ  ation as a deter-
minant of current inﬂ  ation, and these forward-looking 
expectations are crucial for the result that is optimal 
for the central bank to offset shocks to the price level.
8  The equation can be written as follows:
 where      is the deviation of inﬂ  ation from its target or trend at time  ,     denotes 
expected future deviation of the inﬂ  ation rate,     is the output gap,     is a “cost-push” 
error term, and     and     are parameters.
9  Since the central bank cannot completely eliminate ﬂ  uctuations in two variables using 
only one instrument, it minimizes a loss function that depends on a weighted average of 
squared deviations of inﬂ  ation from its target rate and of the squared output gap. This 
form of loss function can be derived under certain assumptions as an approximation to 
the utility function of a representative household. See Woodford (2003) for details. Inﬂ  ation 
has a direct impact on economic welfare because it inﬂ  uences the dispersion of prices 
across different ﬁ  rms and thereby decreases the efﬁ  ciency of production. 
10  This result was ﬁ  rst demonstrated by Woodford (1999) and by Clarida, Galí, and Gertler 
(1999).
the traditional view concerning increased short-run 
variability of prices and output under PT. Examples 
include Lebow, Roberts, and Stockton (1992), and 
Haldane and Salmon (1995). The contribution of the 
more recent literature on PT has been to show that, 
under some circumstances, PT can actually lead to 
an improved trade-off between inﬂ  ation and output 
variability. Much of the focus of recent papers has 
been to investigate just how wide the range of these 
circumstances is.
The traditional view sees PT as a trade-
off between increased price-level pre-
dictability and increased variability of 
both prices and output.
Optimal Monetary Policy with 
Forward-Looking Expectations
Much of the modern analysis of PT has been con-
ducted in the context of so-called New Keynesian 
macroeconomic models.6 These models have 
become workhorses for monetary policy analysis by 
both central banks and academic economists.7 New 
Keynesian models have monopolistically competi-
tive ﬁ  rms that set prices optimally but are unable, by 
assumption, to reset their prices every period. When 
they do have the opportunity to revise their prices, 
ﬁ  rms take into account the marginal cost of producing 
their output and, knowing that they will not be able to 
adjust their prices for several periods, they forecast 
the evolution of the overall price level over the period 
for which their price will remain ﬁ  xed. The optimal 
behaviour of ﬁ  rms in such a setting, when aggregated 
across the different ﬁ  rms in the economy, yields the 
“New Keynesian Phillips curve.” This equation states 
that current inﬂ  ation depends directly both on ﬁ  rms’ 
real marginal costs of production and on their current 
forecast of future inﬂ  ation. Real marginal cost is in turn 
related, under certain assumptions (see Clarida, Galí, 
and Gertler 1999), to the output gap, the difference 
6  See Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) for a detailed summary of the standard New Keynes-
ian model and an application to optimal monetary policy.
7  The main model currently in use for internal forecasting purposes at the Bank of Canada, 
ToTEM, is an elaborate version of a New Keynesian model. See Murchison and Rennison 
(2006) for a detailed description. 
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tral bank is a perfect substitute for commitment. It has 
the effect of affecting expectations of future inﬂ  ation 
in the same way as the optimal monetary policy under 
commitment. In response to a positive cost-push 
shock to inﬂ  ation, expectations of future inﬂ  ation fall, 
improving the current trade-off between output vari-
ability and inﬂ  ation variability.
Vestin’s result holds under quite restrictive assump-
tions: If the cost-push shock has any persistence, it is 
no longer possible to attain the same level of welfare 
as under commitment. However, under a much wider 
range of circumstances, it is possible to do better 
than the optimal discretionary monetary policy by 
assigning a price-level target to the central bank.
Svensson’s (1999) seminal paper was the ﬁ  rst to 
construct a model in which an improved short-run 
trade-off between output and inﬂ  ation variability 
is possible under discretion. His model was built 
around a New Classical Phillips curve, in which 
current inﬂ  ation depends on the previous period’s 
expectation of current inﬂ  ation as well as the output 
gap. His main result was that, when the output gap 
is persistent, assigning a price-level target to the 
central bank improves the trade-off between inﬂ  ation 
variability and output variability. Inﬂ  ation expectations 
in Svensson’s model are indirectly forward-looking. 
With a persistent endogenous output gap, the central 
bank can affect the future trade-off between inﬂ  ation 
and output variability by affecting the current output 
gap. As the output gap becomes more persistent, the 
central bank’s ability to affect the future trade-off is 
enhanced.13 
Forward-looking inﬂ  ation expectations, either direct 
or indirect, are key here. Dittmar and Gavin (2000) 
showed that replacing the New Classical Phillips curve 
with the New Keynesian Phillips curve in Svensson’s 
(1999) model leads to an improved trade-off even 
without endogenous persistence in the output gap. In 
a recent article, Cover and Pecorino (2005) used the 
same basic model as Svensson (1999) but changed 
the assumption of the timing of the central bank’s 
decisions. They supposed that the central bank must 
choose its optimal policy before knowing the current 
value of aggregate disturbances. In such a context, 
the aggregate demand side of the economy plays an 
active role in the determination of macroeconomic 
equilibrium, rather than just recursively determining 
the nominal interest rate necessary to attain the 
13  It can be shown that if the output persistence is purely exogenous (arising from, for 
example, a persistent error term in the Phillips curve equation), there are no advantages to 
be had by assigning a price-level target to the central bank.
Committing to ﬁ  ghting future inﬂ  ation  
improves the trade-off between inﬂ  ation 
and output.
Optimal monetary policy under commitment gener-
ally has the property that it is time inconsistent.11  
That is, it is in the interest of the central bank (and in 
the interest of society as a whole if the central bank 
maximizes social welfare) to renege on its announced 
path for the interest rate. It can achieve a higher level 
of welfare by choosing a new optimal policy. In turn, 
if individuals recognize the central bank’s incentive to 
do this, then unless the bank can credibly commit to 
its announced path for interest rates, its policy will not 
be believed by the public. An inability to commit to 
its announced policies reduces the level of economic 
welfare that the central bank can achieve.
What is the central bank’s optimal policy if it is unable 
to commit to its future policies? (It is standard to refer 
to optimal policy in this case as “optimal discretionary 
policy.”) It can be shown that the optimal policy rule 
has the property that the rate of inﬂ  ation—and there-
fore the short-term interest rate set by the central 
bank—should vary with the level of the output gap. In 
this case, the central bank allows a temporary cost-
push shock to have a permanent effect on the price 
level, unlike the case of optimal monetary policy with 
commitment.
It is also possible to direct the bank to set a goal of 
reducing ﬂ  uctuations in output and the price level, 
even if society’s true economic welfare depends on 
reducing ﬂ  uctuations in output and inﬂ  ation. Howitt 
(2001) calls this instructing the central bank to act like 
a “Zen archer” by aiming at a target that is not soci-
ety’s true target.12  
In this context, Vestin (2006) demonstrated a remark-
able result. In a standard New Keynesian model, 
as long as cost-push shocks are not persistent, the 
central bank can attain the same level of economic 
welfare under discretion as it can under commitment 
if it uses a loss function that depends on price-level 
deviations and provided that the relative weight on 
price-level deviations in the loss function is chosen 
11  The classic reference on the time inconsistency of optimal government policies is Kydland 
and Prescott (1979).
12  Assigning an objective different from the true social welfare function to the central bank 
has a long tradition in macroeconomics. One of the best known examples is Rogoff 
(1985), who constructed a model in which appointing a “conservative” central banker 
who is more concerned than society as a whole with ﬁ  ghting inﬂ  ation could lead to an 
unambiguously better outcome, with lower inﬂ  ation and the same average level of output.
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Patrick Minford with various co-authors (Minford 
2004; Minford, Nowell, and Webb 2003; Minford 
and Peel 2003). They build models with households 
that cannot insure against ﬂ  uctuations in their real 
wage and that have a strong interest in smoothing 
ﬂ  uctuations in their real wage. The equilibrium degree 
of indexation of nominal wages to the price level is 
also endogenous and can depend on the monetary 
policy regime that is in place. They ﬁ  nd that the 
optimal degree of wage indexation is lower under a PT 
regime, and that this can lead to substantial welfare 
beneﬁ  ts. The superiority of PT results from reducing 
ﬂ  uctuations in the real wage in response to monetary 
shocks.
The optimal degree of wage indexation 
is lower under a PT regime, and this can 
lead to substantial welfare beneﬁ  ts.
Amano, Ambler, and Ireland (2007) develop a model 
with nominal wage rigidities and an endogenous 
degree of indexation to unexpected changes in the 
price level. They show, as in Minford’s work with his 
co-authors, that the optimal degree of wage indexa-
tion is lower under a PT regime. Improved welfare 
under PT in their model comes from a different mech-
anism: It helps the economy respond better to real 
shocks, moving the labour market closer to Walrasian 
equilibrium.15 
Other Issues
Price-level targeting and the zero bound
The research program announced by the Bank of 
Canada in November 2006 proposed looking at both 
a lower inﬂ  ation target and the potential advantages 
of PT. The two sets of questions are actually closely 
related. A commonly stated objection to a lower inﬂ  a-
tion target is that it raises the possibility that nominal 
short-term interest rates will hit the so-called zero 
bound: The central bank cannot lower its policy rate 
below zero, given the availability of an alternative 
asset, namely money balances, that always pays a 
zero nominal rate of interest. In response to large 
15  Walrasian equilibrium refers to a situation where all markets are perfectly competitive and 
all prices and wages adjust simultaneously to equate supply and demand in all markets.
central bank’s chosen rate of inﬂ  ation. In their model, 
aggregate demand depends on the real interest rate, 
equal to the nominal interest rate minus expected 
inﬂ  ation based on current information. Their main 
result is that PT gives an improved trade-off even 
with no persistence of the output gap. When there is 
a positive inﬂ  ation shock under PT, expected future 
inﬂ  ation declines, which yields a higher real interest 
rate for any given level of the nominal interest rate. 
This reduces aggregate demand, which reduces the 
equilibrium inﬂ  ation rate in the current period.
Ball, Mankiw, and Reis (2005) analyzed a model with a 
Phillips curve derived in a setting where price-setters 
pay costs to update their information concerning 
macroeconomic conditions. Like the New Classical 
Phillips curve, it depends on past expectations of 
current inﬂ  ation as well as the output gap. Like Cover 
and Pecorino (2005), they suppose that the central 
bank sets its policy before observing current shocks. 
They show that optimal policy under commitment 
gives a stationary price level, a result similar to that of 
Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (1999) 
for New Keynesian models.14 Ball, Mankiw, and Reis 
(2005) stress that the beneﬁ  cial effects of PT in their 
model come from reducing the prediction errors of 
price-setters.
Contracting, Indexation, and 
Price-Level Targeting
Most of the literature comparing PT and IT takes as 
given the type and degree of nominal rigidity across 
the two types of monetary policy regimes. It is 
important to note that the details of how prices are set 
in New Keynesian models are imposed by assump-
tion. Any comparison between the two types of 
regime that holds the type of nominal rigidity constant 
is potentially vulnerable to the Lucas (1976) critique. 
Barnett and Engineer (2001, 132) note that:
The literature has yet to examine how policy 
endogenously affects contracting and 
expectations. For example, the Calvo (1983) 
staggered-price-setting model is used in the 
New-Keynesian analysis. Yet it is not clear 
that this model of price setting is optimal in 
both IT and PT worlds. Similarly, wage and 
ﬁ  nancial contracts may display quite dif-
ferent forms under different policy regimes.
14  I conjecture that, as in New Keynesian models, assigning a price-level target to a central 
bank that is unable to commit to its policies would also be welfare improving in their 
framework.
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reason, monetary policy has more leverage at or near 
the zero bound under PT than under IT. The effects of 
PT on the zero bound have been analyzed rigorously 
by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Wolman 
(2005). Both papers ﬁ  nd that PT is advantageous in 
helping economies avoid the zero bound problem.
Price-level drift with rule-of-thumb 
expectations
One shortcoming of the standard New Keynesian 
Phillips curve, ﬁ  rst pointed out by Fuhrer and Moore 
(1995), is that it is unable to generate persistent 
inﬂ  ation. The typical response to this empirical 
shortcoming has been to add lagged inﬂ  ation to the 
New Keynesian Phillips curve equation. The usual 
justiﬁ  cation for the presence of lagged inﬂ  ation is that 
a fraction of ﬁ  rms are rule-of-thumb price-setters, 
setting their price based on past inﬂ  ation rather than 
their rational expectation of future inﬂ  ation (see, for 
example, Galí and Gertler 1999).
A general result of models with lagged inﬂ  ation is 
that some degree of price-level drift is optimal, even 
if the central bank can commit to its future policies. 
Steinsson (2003) demonstrates this result in a model 
in which a fraction of ﬁ  rms follow a particular rule of 
thumb: They set prices equal to the mean level of 
prices in the previous period, adjusted for lagged 
inﬂ  ation and also adjusted to vary directly with the 
lagged output gap. He shows that as the fraction of 
ﬁ  rms that are rule-of-thumb price-setters increases, 
the amount by which the central bank should opti-
mally offset unexpected changes in inﬂ  ation becomes 
smaller.
Why is it not optimal to eliminate price-level drift when 
expectations are not forward-looking? A change in the 
price level in New Keynesian models arises because 
those ﬁ  rms that are able to modify their output price 
choose to do so. This creates a distortion in relative 
prices that reduces the efﬁ  ciency of production.17 If 
the central bank tries to bring the price level back to 
its initial level or path, ﬁ  rms whose relative prices are 
out of equilibrium may not be able to change their 
prices, and ﬁ  rms whose prices are on the equilibrium 
path may be pushed out of equilibrium. Minford (2004) 
puts it this way:
The best thing to do strictly depends on the 
chances of being allowed to change your 
price. If it is low (the usual assumption), 
17  See Ambler (2007–2008) for a detailed explanation.
negative inﬂ  ation shocks that call for an expansionary 
monetary policy, the zero lower bound may become a 
binding constraint on monetary policy.
The possible advantages of PT close to the zero 
bound are of more than merely theoretical interest. 
Currently (March 2009), several major central banks 
have moved their policy rates close to zero and are 
actively seeking ways to make their monetary policies 
even more expansionary. One possibility that has 
received some attention is PT.16 Under IT, if inﬂ  a-
tion is expected to remain at or close to zero for an 
extended period of time, followed by a return to a low 
targeted inﬂ  ation rate, the average expected inﬂ  ation 
rate over this period would be close to zero. Under a 
credible commitment to a price-level path, average 
expected inﬂ  ation would be equal to the slope of the 
price-level path (the long-run inﬂ  ation rate). For the 
same time path of short-term nominal interest rates, 
the long-term real interest rate would be lower by the 
difference in average expected inﬂ  ation, resulting in 
stronger aggregate demand.
Monetary policy has more leverage at 
or near the zero bound under PT than 
under IT.
Some authors have suggested that, for a given target 
inﬂ  ation rate, adopting a PT regime with a price-level 
path that gives the same rate of inﬂ  ation in the long 
run can help to avoid hitting the zero lower bound. The 
argument for why this would be the case is straight-
forward. A negative inﬂ  ation shock under PT is, if the 
regime is credible, expected to be followed by inﬂ  ation 
that is higher than average in order to bring the price 
level back to its predetermined path. The channel 
through which monetary policy has real effects oper-
ates through the real interest rate. With expected 
inﬂ  ation increasing in response to a negative inﬂ  ation 
shock, the bank’s policy rate has to be reduced by 
less to achieve the same decrease in the real interest 
rate compared with a situation in which inﬂ  ation 
16  For example, Mankiw (2008) writes, “ Suppose the Fed cuts the federal funds rate once 
again to, say, 25 basis points. More important, at the same time, the Fed announces a 
target path for the price level as measured by the core CPI. The price path might be, say, 
an increase of 2 or 3 per cent per year. The Fed promises not to raise the fed funds rate 
over the next 12 months and, after that, will keep the funds rate at that low level as long 
as the price level is signiﬁ  cantly below its target path. The credibility of the promise is 
paramount. To get long-term real interest rates down, the Fed needs to convince markets 
that it will vigorously combat deﬂ  ation, and that if deﬂ  ation happens in the short run, the 
Fed will reverse it by subsequently producing extra inﬂ  ation. . . . Monetary economists will 
recognize that this policy is price-level targeting rather than inﬂ  ation targeting.”
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there is a low chance of those who already 
changed their price being allowed to change 
it back. If it is high (over 50%), then reversal 
could be worthwhile as there is a good 
chance that those who already changed 
could change back. The break-even chance 
is 50%; below this it is optimal to keep the 
new price level.
Reversing unexpected price-level changes may 
merely exacerbate relative price distortions. To the 
extent that expectations are backward-looking, the 
beneﬁ  ts in the short run from an improved trade-off 
between output and inﬂ  ation are smaller, and it 
becomes optimal to not completely offset the initial 
shock to the price level, since fewer additional distor-
tions are created.
Average-inﬂ  ation targeting
A straightforward way to vary the amount of price-
level drift under discretionary monetary policy is 
by targeting a moving average of current and past 
inﬂ  ation rates rather than the current inﬂ  ation rate. By 
increasing the size of the window used to calculate 
the moving average, the amount of price-level drift in 
the long run in response to an unanticipated change 
in the price level is reduced. As the size of the window 
tends towards inﬁ  nity, price-level drift is eliminated 
completely, and the price level becomes stationary.
Recent studies show that targeting 
average inﬂ  ation can dominate both IT 
and PT under certain circumstances.
Nessén and Vestin (2005) show that, under discre-
tion, targeting average inﬂ  ation can yield a superior 
outcome to IT in a forward-looking model. PT still 
dominates in a completely forward-looking model. 
This is not surprising, since Vestin (2006) showed that 
PT with an appropriately chosen weight on price-level 
ﬂ  uctuations can reproduce the optimum under com-
mitment. More interestingly, they show that targeting 
average inﬂ  ation can dominate both IT and PT under 
certain circumstances, as long as the fraction of 
rule-of-thumb price-setters is positive, but not too 
large. The size of the window for calculating average 
inﬂ  ation that provides the best performance depends 
directly on the fraction of rule-of-thumb price-setters. 
In some cases, the performance of average-inﬂ  ation 
targeting is very close to the optimal monetary policy 
under commitment. If the fraction of rule-of-thumb 
price-setters becomes too large, however, IT is better 
for economic welfare than PT.
Nessén and Vestin’s results on average-inﬂ  ation 
targeting are closely related to papers on the practice 
of hybrid targeting.18 In these papers, the central 
bank’s loss function is made to depend on a weighted 
average of price-level deviations and inﬂ  ation. A 
positive weight on price-level deviations means no 
price-level drift in the very long run, but varying the 
relative weights on price-level deviations and inﬂ  ation 
deviations changes the speed at which the price level 
is brought back to its target path. The behaviour of 
inﬂ  ation and prices in the short and medium runs can 
be made to be very similar to their behaviour under 
average-inﬂ  ation targeting. The relative weights that 
yield the highest welfare depend in a complicated way 
on the parameters of the model. For some parameter 
values, hybrid targeting can dominate both IT and PT. 
As in the case of average-inﬂ  ation targeting, this tends 
to occur in cases where price setting is dominated 
neither by forward-looking nor by rule-of-thumb price-
setters.
Prolonged movements in relative prices: 
Which price level?
Most of the models that have been used to study the 
costs and beneﬁ  ts of PT have contained either one or 
a small number of goods sectors. The models feature 
relative price changes across differentiated goods 
within a particular sector, which are always inefﬁ  cient. 
Prolonged relative price swings across broad classes 
of goods such as commodities and manufactured 
goods are absent from these models. Volatile swings 
in subcomponents of the consumer price index (CPI) 
have led central banks such as the Bank of Canada 
to construct measures of “core” inﬂ  ation that leave 
out these components. While the ofﬁ  cial target of 
the Bank of Canada remains the CPI, core inﬂ  ation is 
tracked closely and is used as one of many measures 
of the pressure on inﬂ  ation over the short to medium 
term.
Ortega and Rebei (2006) address this issue in a 
multi-sector framework. They also analyze the relative 
advantages of PT and IT and of a weighted average 
of the two. They construct a small open economy 
model of the Canadian economy with traded and 
non-traded sectors, and with nominal price rigidities 
in both sectors (and differential pricing of traded 
18  See Batini and Yates (2003) and Cecchetti and Kim (2005).
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duced by monopolistically competitive ﬁ  rms. These 
ﬁ  rms have identical production functions, they are all 
affected in the same way by aggregate technology 
shocks, and their goods enter the aggregate produc-
tion function for ﬁ  nal output symmetrically. However, 
since they choose prices at different times (price 
setting is staggered), they do so based on different 
information and therefore do not all set the same 
price.19 It is not generally optimal to induce ﬁ  rms that 
are currently setting their prices to lower them in order 
to compensate for unexpectedly high prices set by 
ﬁ  rms in previous periods.
Conclusions
Table 1 summarizes the main results from recent 
research on PT. The principal beneﬁ  t from PT results 
from the improved trade-off between output and 
inﬂ  ation when expectations are forward-looking, 
making it less costly for the central bank to reduce 
current inﬂ  ation. Expectations can be directly forward-
looking, as in the basic New Keynesian Phillips curve, 
or indirectly forward-looking, as in either Svensson’s 
(1999) model with endogenous output persistence 
or when forward-looking expectations affect the 
equilibrium, as happens with both Cover and Pecorino 
(2005) and Ball, Mankiw, and Reis (2005). In these 
circumstances, the price level is optimally stationary 
when the central bank can commit to its future poli-
cies, and assigning a price-level target to a central 
bank can lead to superior outcomes under discretion. 
When information is costly, as in the Ball, Mankiw, and 
Reis model (2005), PT can be beneﬁ  cial by reducing 
the average size of forecast errors. When price and 
wage setting depend on the monetary policy regime, 
PT can reduce the incentive for contingent wage 
indexation and can improve economic performance 
in the face of real shocks. Finally, when trend inﬂ  ation 
is low, PT can help to alleviate zero bound problems. 
Only when price setting is based on rule-of-thumb 
behaviour that does not take into account the model’s 
structure does some drift in the price level become 
optimal. Even then, pure PT can be superior to pure IT 
as long as the fraction of rule-of-thumb price-setters 
is not too high.
19  Price dispersion across ﬁ  rms is one of the main costs of inﬂ  ation in New Keynesian 
models. See Ambler (2007–2008) for a discussion.
goods between domestic and export markets) as well 
as nominal wage rigidities. No clear advantages of PT 
over IT emerge, and it is difﬁ  cult to discern the key 
assumptions in their model that are responsible for 
their results. Aoki (2001) builds a somewhat simpler 
two-sector model. One of the sectors is a competitive, 
ﬂ  exible-price sector, and one is a sticky-price sector 
with monopolistically competitive ﬁ  rms. He ﬁ  nds that 
the optimal monetary policy in this framework entails 
the complete stabilization of inﬂ  ation in the sticky-
price sector alone. Insofar as relative prices must 
ﬂ  uctuate in order to reduce ﬂ  uctuations in the output 
gap, this allows prices in the ﬂ  exible-price sector to 
do all of the adjusting.
While Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) do not 
focus on the choice of the price index, their results are 
suggestive. They build a forward-looking model with 
both nominal wage and nominal price rigidities. They 
show that it is optimal to target a weighted average of 
wage inﬂ  ation and price inﬂ  ation. The relative weight 
on wage inﬂ  ation versus price inﬂ  ation is directly 
related to the average length of nominal wage rigidity 
compared with the average length of nominal price 
rigidity. Their results are compatible with those of 
Aoki and can be interpreted as a generalization of his 
results, since the relative degree of rigidity of prices 
and wages is variable in their model.
Monetary policy should stabilize stickier 
prices, allowing more ﬂ  exible prices to 
adjust on their own.
This suggests that monetary policy should focus 
primarily (but not exclusively) on reducing ﬂ  uctuations 
in prices that are relatively more sticky, allowing more 
ﬂ  exible prices to adjust relative to these rigid prices. 
This solution represents a compromise. It facilitates 
relative price adjustment across different broad cat-
egories of goods while at the same time dampening 
inefﬁ  cient relative price ﬂ  uctuations across different 
monopolistic producers of the same category of 
good. Even though the Bank of Canada does not 
directly target core inﬂ  ation, looking closely at a less 
volatile component of the overall price index is in 
keeping with the spirit of this result.
The result indicating that past inﬂ  ation surprises 
should not be offset is related to the discussion of this 
section. Even though most New Keynesian models 
have one homogeneous ﬁ  nal good, price setting is 
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their vulnerability to the Lucas critique), some amount 
of price-level drift in response to inﬂ  ation surprises 
will be optimal. The section on average-inﬂ  ation 
targeting showed that the amount of price-level drift 
in response to exogenous shocks can be varied by 
assigning to the central bank an objective function 
deﬁ  ned in terms of a moving average of past inﬂ  ation 
rates as a target rather than the current inﬂ  ation rate. 
An important beneﬁ  t of targeting average inﬂ  ation is 
that it could simplify a central bank’s communication 
of its policy to the private sector and minimize the 
changes in communication strategy in switching from 
an IT regime to a PT regime.20 Comparing the level 
of economic welfare with average-inﬂ  ation targeting 
under discretion and that attainable under commit-
ment should be one focus of future research.
The papers reviewed here are normative, having to 
do with characterizing optimal monetary policy, and 
depend critically on whether or not the central bank 
is assumed to be able to commit to its future poli-
cies. This begs the question as to which assumption, 
discretion or commitment, is more appropriate as a 
positive description of central bank behaviour. This 
has been a controversial subject in the literature. 
Price levels in economies with IT regimes appear to 
have been non-stationary. This could be interpreted 
as evidence either of discretionary behaviour or of 
rule-of-thumb price setting in the models used by the 
central banks to establish their policies.
20  By tracking monthly ﬂ  uctuations in year-on-year inﬂ  ation, central banks that target 
inﬂ  ation are already targeting a 12-month moving average of monthly inﬂ  ation rates. 
Simply changing the number of terms used to calculate the moving average could greatly 
simplify the adjustment to a new regime.
Table 1:   Arguments for and against Price-Level 
Targeting
Arguments in favour of PT
Situation
•  Forward-looking price setters
•  Commitment not possible
•  Costly to update information
•  Endogenous indexation
•  Low trend inﬂ ation
•  Flexible prices in some sectors
Advantages of PT
•  Prices stable under commitment 
•  PT can substitute for commitment
•  Reduced forecast errors under PT
•  Improved response to real shocks
•  Zero bound problem less severe




•  Rule-of-thumb behaviour
•  Persistent relative price changes
 required
Disadvantages of PT
•  Some price-level drift optimal
•  Targeting overall price level not
 optimal
The rule-of-thumb price-setting rules in current 
models provide a convenient shortcut that helps to 
generate the degree of inﬂ  ation persistence observed 
in the data; they are also the least theoretically satis-
factory feature of New Keynesian models. It is unclear 
whether policy recommendations should be based on 
ad hoc modelling assumptions that are as vulnerable 
to the Lucas critique as previous generations of 
macroeconomic models. One characteristic of the 
rule-of-thumb price setting used in New Keynesian 
macroeconomic models is that it gives no weight 
whatsoever to monetary policy announcements. It 
should be possible to come up with price-setting rules 
that, while not fully compatible with rational expecta-
tions, take into account credible announcements of 
future monetary policy.
Insofar as backward-looking expectations remain an 
integral part of New Keynesian models (despite the 
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